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EBRAHÈM KALANTAR Shirazi, Haji Mirza MOHAMMAD Kalantar and Etemad-al-Dawla (b. 1158/1745, d. 1215/1800 or 1216/1801), lord mayor (kalantar) of Shiraz during the late Zand era, the first grand vizier (sáadr-e azáam), and a major political figure of the Qajar period.

 

Background and early career. He was the third son of Moháammad-Hashem, the warden (kadkòoda) of the Balakaft quarter and later chief warden (kadkòoda-bashi) of the five Háaydari quarters of Shiraz. His family, the Hashemiya, was of mercantile origin, owned estates in the Fars province, and was involved in the city administration. His maternal lineage reportedly goes back to Qewam-al-Din Hasan, the minister of the 14th-century Muzaffarid dynasty (after whom the influential house of Qawam[-al-Molk] was named), but his paternal Jewish ancestry cannot be established beyond doubt (Fasaai, ed. Rastgar, I, pp. 679-80; II, pp. 960-70; for his family tree, see ˆarif ˆirazi, pp. 339, 342; Fasaai, tr. Busse, app. IV, pp. 430-31).

 

Mirza Ebrahim's training in urban administration and his introduction to the intricate politics of Shiraz began in earnest during the later years of Karim Khan's reign (1163-93/1750-79), when the urban notables (ayan) of the Zand capital were curtailed by Karim Khan, without their economic base being ruined and social network eroded. Moháammad-Hashem's loss of one eye, a punishment inflicted upon him by Nader Shah in 1160/1747 for an alleged fiscal irregularity, must have been an apt reminder to his son, Ebrahim, of the notables' vulnerability to the ephemeral warlords of the post-Safavid period. Ebrahim inherited the chief wardenship of the Haydari quarters of Shiraz and became a close ally of the lord mayor of the Zand capital, Mirza Moháammad Kalantar (d. 1200/1785), his mentor and an influential figure in shaping young Ebrahim's political outlook. He also witnessed the workings of the Zand administration under the aegis of remnants of the late Safavid bureaucratic elite such as Mirza Hosayn Wafa, the head of the Farahani family, which was later known as the Qaaem-maqams (Kalantar, pp. dal, 21, 91, 108-09; Jones, pp. cxxiii-cxxv; Malcolm, II, pp. 176-77).

 

In the transitory period following Karim Khan's death (1193/1779), the weakening of the Zand rule was accelerated by a deadly struggle for the crown among the princes and chiefs of the Zand house as well as by Aqa Moháammad Khan Qajar's relentless drive for control of southern provinces. For resilient city officials such as Ebrahim this was a new opportunity to exert greater autonomy. It also saddled them with the arduous task of defending the city, and their own vested interests, against a backdrop of intense urban factionalism and tribal warlords. Ebrahim's life and career were largely shaped by the complexities of this period (1779-94) and by a prevailing sense of Machiavellian expediency. Between 1193/1779 and 1196/1782 the notables of Shiraz, headed by the mayor of the city and his lieutenants, including Mirza Ebrahim, first faced the excesses of Zaki Khan. He was Karim Khan's half-brother and held the power behind the shaky throne of Abu'l-Fathá Khan, Karim Khan's son and successor. To counterbalance Zaki Khan's tyranny, the notables threw their lot behind Sadeq Khan Zand, Karim Khan's other brother. With the help of Circassian guards, Sáadeq Khan prevailed as the new regent to Abu'l-Fathá Khaná. Frustrated with Sadeq Khan's tyranny and incompetence and with the continuous cycle of bloodshed and anarchy, some notables then consented to the claim of yet another Zand chief, Ali-Morad Khan (q.v.), who captured the city in 1196/1782 after nine months of siege and carnage.

 

Mindful of ˆirazi civil officers and their influence over the Zand capital, Ali-Morad Khan (1193-99/1779-85) immediately ordered Mirza Moháammad Kalantar and his cohorts, among them Mirza Ebrahim, to accompany him to Isfahan, his new seat of power. Not much is known about this episode of Mirza Ebrahim's life. While in Ali-Morad Khan's service he apparently made a pilgrimage to Mecca. He also maintained contact with the Shiraz bazar and city quarters and managed in absentia his own family landholdings. After Ali-Morad Khan's death in 1199/1785, upon Aqa Moháammad Khan Qajar's approach to the city, Haji Ebrahim and other exiles fled to Shiraz in the company of Sadeq Khan's son, the adventurous Jafar Khan Zand. Mirza Moháammad Kalantar, whose prospects in Shiraz were insecure, stayed in Isfahan only to become Aqa Moháammad Khan's captive. In his memoirs he regrettted that he did not abide by the "plain argument" of his "revered son" (farzand-e arjomand) Haji Moháammad-Ebrahim, who had warned him that "waiting is dangerous; whatever happens to other people [notables] of Fars will happen to you too; you are supposed to be the mayor" (Kalantar, p. 91; for events of this period, see ibid., pp. 68-91; Fasaai, ed. Rastgar, I, pp. 618-33; tr., Busse, pp. 1-25; Nami, pp. 218-74).

 

Lord Mayorship of Shiraz. Upon his arrival in Shiraz Haji Ebrahim was appointed the new kalantar by Jafar Khan Zand, whose transitory rule (1199-1202/1785-87) was marred by clashes with other Zand chiefs and princes and with Aqa Moháammad Khan. Yet his rule lasted long enough for Haji Ebrahim to consolidate his urban base in collaboration with city wardens, the bazar, the city brigands (lutis), and Qashqaai and other tribal chiefs of Fars. In the internecine conflict with the ex-governor of the city, the unpopular Sáayd Morad Khan Zand, and his brothers, Jafar Khan was murdered. The Kalantar was left with the unenviable tasks of recapturing Sayd Morad Khan and his followers and elevating Lotf-Ali Khan, the twenty-three year old son of Jafar Khan, to the Zand throne. Lotf-Ali Khan, who at the time was campaigning in southern Fars, was popular with the tribal troops and the city inhabitants for his gallantry and modesty. He entered the city in ˆaban 1203/May 1789 and, with the blessings of the mayor and other city and state officials, ascended the Zand throne after putting to death the hated Sayd Morad and his aides.

 

Soon, however, the symbiosis between the young king and the lord mayor came to an end. Facing an immediate threat from his Qajar rival in ˆawwal 1203/June 1789, when Aqa Moháammad Khan staged his second sortie against Shiraz, Lotf-Ali Khan withdrew inside the city walls and allowed the Qajar khan to besiege the city until September. In Ramazµan 1204/May 1790 the Qajar khan again reappeared before Shiraz walls, forcing the ill-equipped Lotf-Ali Khan to abandon the city and to retreat to southern Fars. From there he embarked on a futile siege to capture Kerman. In his absence, Kalantar, who was the master of the city and was appointed as the vizier and regent to Lotf-Ali Khan's young son, K¨osrow, entered into a power struggle with the Zand chiefs for control of the citadel (arg). Upon Lotf-Ali Khan's return, his "confidence and respect" toward the Kalantar changed, owing to charges of "treason and obstinacy," brought against the lord mayor by his opponents. Earlier on, acting on his mother's behest, Lotf-Ali Khan had ordered the execution of one of the Kalantar's allies, a certain Mirza Mahdi, who was the secretary of the army (lashkarnevis) and was charged with conspiring against Lotáf-Ali's slain father. This execution, possibly a warning to the Kalantar to provide funds necessary for Lotf-Ali Khan's future campaigns, alienated the notables wary of such costly undertakings. Yet Lotf-Ali Khan was well aware that the survival of his own throne depended on the mayor. Fasaai states that the "people of Shiraz had great respect for Haji Ebrahim, that the governor of the districts and the chiefs of the tribes had a strong affection for him, and that most of the infantry of Lotf-Ali Khan were under the command of his brothers." Suspicious of the mayor's loyalty, Lotf-Ali Khan ordered Mirza Moháammad, Haji Ebrahim's eldest son, to accompany him as a hostage in his next campaign against the Qajars, who now controlled Isfahan. He also placed trusted Zand chiefs in charge of the Shiraz citadel (Fasaai, pp. 645-46; tr. Busse, pp. 40-42; Malcolm, II, p. 178).

 

Lotf-Ali Khan's failure to defend Shiraz and Haji Ebrahim's fear for his own life encouraged him to break with the Zands and eventually switch to the Qajar side. Soon after Lotf-Ali Khan's departure late in 1205/1791 the Kalantar staged a coup against the Zand ruler, which proved to be a turning point in the history of modern Persia. In a bloodless move he arrested the Zand chiefs and took over the citadel. He had the help of an urban militia force recruited from among the lutis and bazar commoners, who were under the command of his brother, Moháammad-Hosayn. He then instructed his two other brothers, who were in Lotf-Ali Khan's camp, to incite a mutiny among the troops. Deserted by his chiefs and by most of his troops, Lotf-Ali Khan hurried back to Shiraz only to be stranded behind its closed gates. Escorted by a small detachment of loyal Tangestani horsemen, he decided to starve his own capital into submission. To repulse Lotf-Ali Khan and his supporters, the Kalantar then threatened the vacillating army chiefs with holding their families hostage inside the city. He also sought the assistance of a Qashqaai chief, Rezµaqoli Khan Kazeruni, and organized ˆahseven and other tribes in the vicinity of Shiraz into a united front. Shaikh Nasár Khan, the semi-autonomous governor of Bushehr, too, was persuaded not to give shelter or other assistance to the deposed king. These efforts were checked by Lotf-Ali Khan's superior performance in the battlefield and by the escape of a number of Zand detainees to his camp. Distrustful of the Zands and unsuccessful in his initial plan to create a confederacy of southern towns, the Kalantar then sent an emissary, Moháammadqoli Khan Qashqaai, to Aqa Moháammad Khan Qajar, offering him a gift of 3,000 mares from a Zand stud and requesting him, on behalf of the people of Fars, to be their new ruler. To this unexpected homage Aqa Moháammad Khan responded positively and appointed the Kalantar as the new governor (beglarbeygi) of Fars, bestowing on him the title of khan.

 

While prevailing over his Qashqaai opponents and gaining control of the hinterlands around Shiraz, Lotf-Ali Khan once again laid siege to the city. Inside, the tribal levies loyal to the Zands also staged a mutiny. Employing another stratagem, the Kalantar was able to disarm and expel the rebellious troops with the help of his luti militia. He also refused to grant Lotf-Ali Khan's request to retire with his family, held captive by the mayor, to India or to Ottoman lands. Threatened by the vacillating Mafi and Nankoli troops in the city, the Kalantar then called upon the Qajar auxiliary detachments stationed in Abada to join his own horsemen from the Qashqaai and ˆahseven tribes. Once it became apparent that these forces were no match for Lotf-Ali Khan's troops, Aqa Moháammad Khan himself set out for Shiraz. In spite of Lotf-Ali Khan's valor in the night attack of 14 ˆawwal 1206/5 June 1792, which nearly routed the Qajar forces, Aqa Moháammad Khan finally prevailed. Entering Shiraz in Dòu'l hejja 1207/21 July 1792, he reinstated the Kalantar as the governor of Fars and carried off to Tehran as war booty the surviving members of Lotf-Ali Khan's family. On his next visit to Shiraz in spring 1208/1793, although he rewarded the Kalantar, his family, and his followers with favors, he committed more acts of violence against the inhabitants. He even forced the notables of Shiraz, including the Kalantar himself, to surrender their women and children as hostages. He also ordered the destruction of the city's massive walls and its arg fortifications in order to deny the city notables the advantage they had used so effectively against previous rulers. By Jomada II 1209/November 1794, when Aqa Moháammad Khan returned to Shiraz, Lotf-Ali Khan had been captured in Bam and brutally tortured by the Qajar khan, who blinded the captive with this own hands before ordering his Torkman golams to rape him, then sending him off to Tehran to be executed. Baba Khan, the future Fathá-Ali Shah, who accompanied his uncle to Shiraz, was appointed as the new governor of the province.

 

It is likely that the Kalantar's initial motive for abandoning Lotf-Ali Khan was not to replace him on the throne with a Qajar khan. Instead, he was hoping to forge a league of semi-autonomous cities and tribal regions in southern Persia. Harford Jones, a Zand sympathizer who viewed the Kalantar's move as no more than an act of treason, nevertheless confirms his "confederacy scheme." It was the failure of this plan to "get rid of king" and then to create "a federative government" with governors of Kerman, Bushehr, and other provinces, as well as with the chiefs of Dashtestan and Garmsir, that in the end obliged the Kalantar to surrender the city to the Qajars and to secure his own safety (Jones, pp. cl, clxxxvi). The K¨amsa tribal confederacy of the Fars province, which was later organized and led by the Kalantar's surviving son, Haji Ali-Akbar Khan Qewam-al-Molk, had its origins in this scheme envisioned by the Kalantar. Years later the Kalantar told Captain John Malcolm that it was his "desire to save his country from the continual petty wars" that persuaded him to turn to the Qajars. "None except some plundering soldiers cared whether a Zund or a Kujur was upon the throne; but all desired that Persia should be great and powerful, and enjoy internal tranquillity." Qualifying the Kalantar's statement, Malcolm regards his chief motive for the act of treason as "self-preservation" (Malcolm, History II, p. 183; idem, Sketches, pp. 222-23). Yet the Kalantar's statement, in tone and content, matches well with the anti-Zand and anti-Qajar sentiments of Haji Ebrahim's mentor, Mirza Moháammad Kalantar (esp. pp. 89-94).

 

Grand vizierate. In his trip to Shiraz in November 1794 Aqa Moháammad Khan appointed the Kalantar the first grand vizier (sáadr-e azáam) of his reign and bestowed on him the title Etemad-al-Dawla (the trustee of the state), the first such title to be granted since the demise of the Safavid state. His promotion to the highest administrative post, primarily because of his political savvy, shrewd maneuvering, and organizational talent, demonstrated the prominence of the Zand notables in shaping the early Qajar government (Malcolm, History II, p. 275). In ˆaban 1210/March 1795 in the new capital, Tehran, the grand vizier heading the state dignitaries, persuaded the apparently reluctant Aqa Moháammad Khan to assume the title of shah, placing on his head the Kayani crown. The grand vizier also tried to put together the rudiments of a central administration in Tehran by recruiting civil and army secretaries and accountants previously in the Zand service. He presided, as Malcolm states, over "every department of state," a fact which no doubt contributed to factional animosity within the bureaucracy (History II, p. 436 n.; for coronation episode, see Fasaai, ed. Rastgar, I, p. 662; Malcolm, History II, pp. 287-88; Sepehr, Tarikò I, pp. 78-79).

 

These efforts were curtailed, however, by the shah's priority of restoring the boundaries of the Safavid empire, which often required the grand vizier's presence in military campaigns. Aqa Moháammad Khan's ambition to control the Caucasus were initially condoned by the grand vizier, who hoped to divert the thrust of the Qajars' destructive campaigns away from the Persian interior. But engagement in the northern frontiers soon forced the young Qajar state to confront a growing Russian threat, especially after an inconclusive campaign in Gorjestan (Georgia) in 1210/1795 and the massacre of the population in Tbilisi. In the following years the grand vizier's position on the northern peripheries was characterized by prudence and accommodation of Russia, although he never fell short of asserting Persian sovereignty over Gorjestan. He remained unmoved, for instance, by the argument of envoys from the revolutionary French Republic, J.-G. Brugieàres and G.-A. Oliver, who in 1796 tried to persuade the shah to consolidate his hold over Georgia and attack the Ottoman Caucasus to gain access to the Black Sea, in exchange for French military assistance. Instead, he appealed to Aqa Moháammad Khan's military tact and approved of his scorched earth strategy as the best way to deal with a superior power such as Russia, a strategy he later reaffirmed to Malcolm in 1801 (Malcolm, History II, pp. 297-98; Camb. Hist. Iran VII, pp. 129-30, 331, 375).

 

Control of the Caucasus, nevertheless, remained Aqa Moháammad Khan's objective. Accompanied by his grand vizier, he was on his way to punish the khan of Qarabagò, Ebrahim Khan Javanshir (q.v.), for switching to the Russian side and to recapture Georgia, when in ˆusha he was murdered by servants of his household on 21 Dòu'l-háejja 1211/16 June 1797. In the utter chaos that followed the shah's death and the breakup of the military camp, the grand vizier was able to muster the larger part of the Qajar army in Adina-bazar camp, including some contingents from Fars loyal to him, and to march toward Tehran via Ardabil and Qazvin. He was joined by the sons of the future king, Fathá-Ali Shah. Loyal to Aqa Moháammad's designated successor, he camped outside Tehran's closed gates and despatched a special emissary to Shiraz inviting Baba Khan, who later became Fathá-Ali Shah, to come to the capital. Aided by Moháammad-Zaman, Haji Ebrahim's brother and the kalantar of Shiraz, the new shah arrived in Safar 1212/August 1797 and confirmed the grand vizier in office prior to his coronation in Tehran in ˆawwal 1212/March 1798. Fathá-Ali Shah's accession, which took place without a civil war, was relatively smooth largely because of Haji Ebrahim's tact and foresight. After the accession, a disloyal uncle of the shah, Aliqoli Khan, was captured and blinded; Moháammad Khan, a Zand contestant in Isfahan, was vanquished and later killed; Nader Mirza, an Afsharid prince in Mashhad, was temporarily overpowered; and Sadeq Khan ˆaqaqi, a Kurdish contender in Azerbaijan, was defeated but pardoned in exchange for the safe return of royal jewels. But Fathá-Ali Shah's most formidable contestant proved to be his own full-brother Hosaynqoli Khan, the new governor of Fars province. Extorting high taxes from Fars and Isfahan, in 1213/1798 he gathered enough force to meet the shah's army in Saruq in the Farahan region. The grand vizier, who accompanied the shah, was anxious not to permit another succession war to destroy the southern provinces, even though members of his own family had fallen victim to the rebellious prince. (Earlier on Hosaynqoli had ordered Moháammad-Zaman and a number of city officials to be blinded.) To undermine Hosaynqoli, he resorted to a stratagem. From the shah's camp he sent a courier to Hosaynqoli's camp with a number of false messages sewn inside the sole of one of his boots. Addressed to the enemy's army chiefs, many of whom were known to the grand vizier, the letters appeared to be favorable royal responses to the chiefs' petitions to abandon the rebellious prince and join the shah. Once the courtier was arrested and his messages discovered, as indeed they were meant to be, the demoralized Hosaynqoli, who was uncertain of his army's loyalty, lost hope and sought the shah's pardon, which was granted through the intercession of the queen mother, an ally and protector of the grand vizier (Fasaai, ed. Rastgar, II, pp. 672-73; tr. Busse, pp. 81-86).

 

The same concern for preserving the precarious tranquillity of the country at the uncertain start of the new reign prompted Haji Ebrahim in 1214/1799 to resist the offer of Mahdi-Ali Khan, the first envoy of the British East India Company (q.v.), to commit Persia to a campaign against the ruler of Kabul, Zaman Shah. Haji Ebrahim's answer to the British plea for defending the Shiites of Lahore against Sunni Afghans was communicated in December 1800 to Malcolm, then on his first mission to Persia. The political concerns of the Persian state, he stressed, are independent from its religious sentiments. Acting as Malcolm's official host (mehmandar) and Persia's chief negotiator, Haji Ebrahim's nevertheless was an advocate of friendly relations with the East India Company and concluded two treaties with England in ˆaban 1215/January 1801. (For the treaties, see C. U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sunnuds XII, Calcutta, 1909; Fasaai, ed. Rastgar, II, p. 678; see also Hedayat, IX, pp. 361-62; Mahámud, I; Camb. Hist. Iran VII, pp. 375-82.)

 

Downfall. Before Malcolm's departure in March 1801, Haji Ebrahim confided to him a grave concern for his own security. The factional conflicts within the bureaucracy and the loss of a powerful ally, the queen mother (Mahd Olya), whom he had known since his days in Shiraz, weakened the grand vizier's position. He also began to lose his awesome grip over the young shah. To Fathá-Ali he was a painful reminder of Aqa Moháammad Khan's era and an obstacle to the life of pleasure and opulence the new shah intended to lead and for which the shah needed new sources of income. On 1 Dòu'l-háejja 1215/14 April 1801 Haji Ebrahim was summoned to the shah's presence and was accused of conspiracy against the crown. Dismissed from his post and placed under arrest, he was blinded in both eyes by the order of the shah and his tongue was cut off, presumably because he dared to admonish the shah for ungratefulness toward him. In an orchestrated move, all adult male members of his family, too, were arrested. Haji Ebrahim's three brothers: Abd-al-Raháim, an aide to the grand vizier; Moháammad-Zaman, the blind kalantar of Shiraz; and Moháammad-Hasan, governor of Kohgiluya were executed. One of the grand vizier's sons, the kalantar of Shiraz Moháammad Khan, and one of his nephews met the same fate. His other son Asad-Allah, who was the governor of Borujerd, was blinded. Not long after, Haji Ebrahim himself was sent to Qazvin and then to Taleqan, where he was put to death (F. K¨avari, apud Fasaai, ed. Rastgar, I, pp. 679-81; tr. Busse, pp. 95-100; Donboli, pp. 71-74; Jones, pp. 128-32; Etemad-al-Saltana, pp. 32-33).

 

There seems to be little truth in allegations of Haji Ebrahim's conspiracy. The secret correspondence with the rebellious Hosaynqoli Mirza presented to Fathá-Ali Shah by the grand vizier's opponents as evidence of his treason, so far as can be determined from mute references in the sources, bears little credibility. The grand vizier's fatal downfall was caused by other factors. He and his relatives controlled most southwestern provinces, including Fars, Lorestan, and Kòuzestan, and held vast estates in Fars and elsewhere. Control of these ex-Zand territories by a powerful grand vizier was a threat to the Qajar's complete sovereignty in the south. The wealth accumulated by Háaji Ebrahim and by his family served as another motive for the shah. The grand vizier's inability to check rival factions in the administration was also responsible for his downfall. Two officials who were instrumental in arousing the shah's suspicion were Mirza ˆafi Aliabadi, who replaced Haji Ebrahim in office, and Mirza Rezµaqoli Navaai, the chief secretary (monshi-al-mamalek). They belonged to the Mazandarani faction and were long-time enemies of the ˆirazi grand vizier in spite of Haji Ebrahim's earlier favors toward Mirza ˆafi (Malcolm, History II, p. 305). Malcolm, whose very presence in the Tehran court sharpened the existing rivalries, claims that he tried to reconcile the grand vizier with his opponents. He also advised Haji Ebrahim to treat the shah's "occasional fits of ill-humor and violence" with more temper. The grand vizier replied that neither could he change his own "plain and downright" nature nor would a lenient course assuage his opponents or decelerate the approach of his fate. He again reiterated his commitment to a united country under a strong government: "I could easily save myself but Persia would again be plunged in warfare. My object has been to give my country one king; I cared not whether he was a Zand or a Kajir, [just] so that there was an end of internal destruction. I have seen enough of these scenes of blood; I will be concerned in no more of them" (Malcolm, Sketches, 2nd ed., pp. 222-23).

 

Suspicious of his grand vizier, Fath-Ali Shah apparently followed Aqa Moháammad Khan's earlier advice "not to allow the gray head of Haji Ibraheem, who had betrayed his first master, to go down in peace to grave" (Watson, p. 128). Even if apocryphal, this advice conformed to the ruthless Qajar practice of executing king-maker ministers. Two of Fathá-Ali's successors committed similar "viziercide" (wazir-koshi) at the outset of their reigns. Mirza Abu'l-Qasem Qaaem-maqam Farahani became a victim in 1836 and Mirza Taqi Khan Amir Kabir (q.v.) in 1852, both eliminated under identical pretexts of conspiracy against the shah.

 

A man of unassuming appearance and mercantile demeanor, Haji Ebrahim was one of the most remarkable but least understood statesmen of modern Persian history. Malcolm, who was on intimate terms with him, praised him as a "truly a great man," a genius, and one of the best statesmen Persia has ever had (Malcolm, History II, p. 275; Sketches, 2nd ed., p. 222). A somewhat romantic portrayal of Lotf-Ali Khan in historical accounts helped demonize Haji Ebrahim as the chief perpetrator of the Zand demise and as an agent of Qajar hegemony. Harford Jones's disparaging remarks about Kalantar's crafty manipulations and treason, in contrast to Lotf-Ali Khan's dignified heroism, is one such account, but he, too, grudgingly acknowledges the "ability and resource" of the grand vizier (Jones, Dynasty, pp. cxliii-cxlv; Camb. Hist. Iran VII, pp. 378-79). Ethical scruples aside, there is enough credit in Haji Ebrahim's political career to redeem him as the architect of Persia's unification and stability under the early Qajars. He aptly detected in Aqa Moháammad Khan a strong and determined ruler capable of bringing to an end a civil war that had ravaged the country for a decade. In a broader sense he perceived the inevitability of Qajar monarchy as a solution to the crisis of legitimacy that had persisted ever since the fall of the Safavids. The prominence of local officials such as Haji Ebrahim in the emerging body politics of the early Qajar period counterbalanced the power of the Qajar tribal nobility. Haji Ebrahim was also an advocate of state support for the Osáuli mojtaheds and an ally of Aqa Moháammad-Ali Behbahani (q.v.) in his campaign against Nemat-Allahi Sufi dissenters. His downfall, on the other hand, denoted the inherent fragility of the ministerial autonomy vis aà vis the monarch's absolute authority, one of the recurring and often tragic themes in Qajar political history.

 

Of Haji Ebrahim's immediate relatives, his young twin sons Ali-Akbar and Ali-Rezµa were spared. Some years later Ali-Akbar, entitled Qawam-al-Molk, retrieved the family's hereditary status in Fars and became the patriarch of the Qawam(i) house of Shiraz, one of the most prominent families of landed notables in Qajar Persia and which for generations played a highly active role in the politics of Fars and in the central administration. Ali-Rezµa, who was castrated at the shah's order, became a eunuch in the royal harem. Among Haji Ebrahim's other surviving relatives, the most prominent was his son-in-law, Haji Moháammad-Hosayn Khan Amin-al-Dawla Sadr Esáfahani, later the grand vizier of Fathá-Ali Shah. His term of office in many respects restored Haji Ebrahim's politics. The celebrated Mirza Abu'l-Hasan Khan Èl±i, a nephew of Haji Ebrahim who had taken refuge in the Hyderabad court, later returned to royal favor and was appointed as the Persian envoy to European courts.

 

Bibliography: (For cited works not given in detail, see "Short References.") Bamdad, Rejal I, pp. 21-28. S. Danesh, Ebrahim Kalantar, Tehran, n.d. Abd-al-Razzaq Donboli, Maaatòer-e sáoltáaniya, Tabriz, 1242/1826, new repr., Tehran, 1351 ˆ./1972, pp. 21-22, 72-74. Moháammad-Háasan Khan Etemad-al-Saltáana, Sáadr al-tawarikò, ed. M. Moshiri, Tehran, 1349 ˆ./1970. Fasaai, ed. Rastgar, I, pp. 667-81; II, pp. 960-70. G. Hambly, "Aqa Mohammad Khan and the Establishment of the Qajar Dynasty," JRCAS 50, 1963, pp. 161-74. Hedayat, Rawzµat al-sáafa IX, pp. 237, 261, 361, 367-70, 419, 458. H. Jones Brydges, The Dynasty of the Kajars, London, 1833, pp. cxIiii-cIxxxix, pp. 128-32. J. Malcolm, A History of Persia, 2 vols., London, 1829. Idem, Sketches of Persia, 2 vols., London, 1815, chaps. xvii-xviii, 2nd ed., London, 1845, pp. 202-04, 222-24. Mirza Moháammad Kalantar, Ruz-nama, ed. A. Eqbal, Tehran, 1325 ˆ./1946, pp. 91, 107-08. M. Mahámud, Tarikò rawabetá-e siasi-e Èran wa Enegls, 8 vols., Tehran, 4th repr., 1361ˆ./1982. J. Morier, A Journey through Persia, Armenia, etc., London, 1812. Mirza Moháammad-Sadeq Nami, Tarikò-e gitigosha, ed. S. Nafisi, Tehran, n.d. G.-A. Olivier, Voyage dans l'empire ottomane, l'Egypte et la Perse, 6 vols., Paris, 1807. Abd-al-Karim ˆarif ˆirazi, D¨ayl-e tarikò-e gitigosha, Tehran, n.d., pp. 339, 342. Moháammad-Taqi Sepehr, Tarikò-e qajariya (Nasekò al-tawarikò), 4 vols., Tehran, 1344 ˆ./1965, I, pp. 110-13. R. G. Watson, A History of Persia, London, 1866, pp. 124-25, 128-29.

(ABBAS AMANAT)